Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Article 311: Appointing Authority Not Required to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings

 

Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Article 311: Appointing Authority Not Required to Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings

Author: Abhishek Jat, Advocate

The Supreme Court has elucidated the scope of Article 311 of the Constitution, holding that while dismissal of a government servant requires the authority of the appointing body, initiation of disciplinary proceedings need not emanate from the same source.

In a significant ruling that refines administrative jurisprudence, a Division Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan allowed an appeal by the State of Jharkhand, reversing the High Court's decision that had invalidated a government servant's dismissal on procedural grounds.

Factual Matrix and Procedural History

The respondent, a state employee, faced allegations of financial malfeasance, forgery, and dereliction of duty. In 2014, the Deputy Commissioner of Koderma initiated disciplinary proceedings, formulating a draft charge sheet containing nine counts of misconduct. This draft, along with proposals for the respondent's suspension and appointment of inquiry officers, received approval from the Chief Minister.

Following inquiry proceedings, the respondent was adjudged culpable on six counts in 2015. Subsequently, the State Cabinet, having secured requisite consent from the State Public Service Commission (the appointing authority) in 2017, sanctioned the respondent's dismissal, which was thereafter ratified by the Governor.

The respondent challenged his dismissal before the High Court, contending that the charge sheet lacked separate and specific approval from the Chief Minister at the time of issuance, thereby vitiating the disciplinary proceedings.

Relying on precedents established in Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath (2014) and State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar, IAS (2018), both the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court nullified the dismissal order, holding that the charge sheet's issuance without separate approval by the competent authority (Chief Minister) constituted a fatal procedural infirmity.

Supreme Court's Analysis and Ratio Decidendi

The apex court, in a judgment authored by Justice Datta, determined that the High Court had erroneously applied the ratio from Gopinath and Promod Kumar cases, which were predicated on central service regulations materially different from Jharkhand's Civil Service Rules.

The Court observed that Jharkhand's regulatory framework does not prescribe mandatory approval of charge sheets by the Chief Minister, but rather permits disciplinary proceedings to be initiated by any superior authority. The Court reasoned that the Chief Minister's approval of the disciplinary proposal, which incorporated the draft charge sheet, constituted sufficient compliance with procedural requirements.

"We are unhesitatingly of the view that according approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, in this case, did amount to approval of the draft charge-sheet," the judgment stated.

The Court emphasized that since the disciplinary proceedings were instituted by the Commissioner (a superior authority), and the ultimate dismissal received the imprimatur of both the State Cabinet and Governor, the High Court's intervention on grounds of procedural irregularity was unwarranted.

Constitutional Interpretation of Article 311(1)

Addressing the respondent's invocation of Article 311(1), the Court provided an authoritative interpretation of this constitutional safeguard. The Court clarified that Article 311(1) exclusively mandates that dismissal or removal be effectuated by an authority not subordinate to the appointing authority.

"Clause (1) does not on its own terms require that the disciplinary proceedings should also be initiated by the appointing authority," the Court observed, distinguishing between the power to dismiss and the authority to initiate proceedings.

Drawing from P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor General (1993), the Court reiterated that "a departmental proceeding need not be initiated only by the appointing authority and that initiation by a subordinate authority, in the absence of rules, is not vitiated."

The Court conclusively held that "unless the relevant discipline and appeal rules applicable to an officer/employee of an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution so require, disciplinary proceedings by issuance of a charge-sheet cannot be faulted solely on the ground that either the Appointing Authority or the Disciplinary Authority has not issued the same or approved it."

Disposition

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reinstating the dismissal order. However, exercising judicial discretion, the Court permitted the respondent to file an appeal or revision petition on other grounds within one month.

This judgment significantly clarifies the procedural framework governing disciplinary actions against government servants, establishing that while dismissal requires the authority of the appointing body as per Article 311(1), the initiation of disciplinary proceedings may emanate from any superior authority unless specifically precluded by applicable service rules.

Case Title: The State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Rukma Kesh Mishra

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult qualified legal professionals for specific legal concerns.