Judicial Duty to Safeguard Freedom of Expression Regardless of Content: Supreme Court's Stance

 Judicial Duty to Safeguard Freedom of Expression Regardless of Content: Supreme Court's Stance

Author: Abhishek Jat, Advocate

Introduction

In a seminal judgment delivered on March 28, 2025, the Supreme Court of India in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 410) reinforced the inviolability of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The case arose from the criminal prosecution of a Member of Parliament for reciting a poem deemed inflammatory by the Gujarat Police. The Court’s ruling not only quashed the FIR but also laid down critical principles to prevent the misuse of penal laws to suppress dissent, emphasizing the judiciary’s role as the ultimate protector of constitutional rights.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The appellant, Imran Pratapgadhi, a Rajya Sabha MP, attended a public event where he recited a poem advocating non-violent resistance to injustice. The poem, which contained lines like "If the fight for our rights is met with injustice, we will meet that injustice with love," was shared on social media. A complaint was filed alleging that the poem incited communal hatred and threatened national unity, leading to an FIR under Sections 196, 197(1), 299, and 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. The Gujarat High Court refused to quash the FIR, citing the preliminary stage of investigation. On appeal, the Supreme Court scrutinized whether the poem’s content and context justified the invocation of penal provisions.

The Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Freedom of Speech as a Fundamental Right

The Court began by reaffirming the centrality of free speech in a democracy, drawing from precedents like Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) and Ramesh v. Union of India (1988). It underscored that Article 19(1)(a) protects not just palatable speech but also expressions that challenge authority or provoke thought. The Bench, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, observed: "Democracy thrives on dissent. The right to critique, even in strong terms, is not a crime but a necessity for societal progress." The Court rejected the notion that abstract or metaphorical language in poetry could be construed as incitement, emphasizing that artistic expression must be assessed holistically rather than through isolated phrases.

2. Absence of Mens Rea and Communal Intent

A key facet of the judgment was the Court’s insistence on mens rea (guilty mind) for offenses like promoting enmity (Section 196, BNS). Relying on Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2007), the Bench noted that penalizing speech requires proof of intent to cause disharmony. The poem, when read in its entirety, conveyed a message of love and resilience, with no reference to religion, caste, or community. The Court adopted the standard of "reasonable, strong-minded individuals"—a test formulated by Justice Vivian Bose in Bhagwati Charan Shukla (1946)—to evaluate its impact. It cautioned against hypersensitive interpretations, stating: "The law cannot cater to those who perceive danger in every dissenting voice."

3. Procedural Safeguards Against Frivolous FIRs

The judgment provided a nuanced interpretation of Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which permits preliminary inquiries for cognizable offenses punishable by 3–7 years. Unlike the CrPC, the BNSS allows such inquiries even if the FIR discloses a cognizable offense, acting as a filter against frivolous cases. The Court directed police to conduct such inquiries where speech-related offenses are alleged, ensuring that freedom of expression is not chilled by arbitrary arrests. It criticized the Gujarat Police for registering the FIR without assessing the poem’s meaning, calling the action "perverse and antithetical to constitutional values."

4. Judicial Duty to Intervene at the Threshold

The Bench rebuked the High Court for deferring to the "nascent stage of investigation" as a reason to deny relief. Citing State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), it clarified that courts can quash FIRs in limine if the allegations, even if true, do not constitute an offense. The judgment admonished judicial reluctance in such cases, stating: "When fundamental rights are trampled, courts cannot remain silent spectators. To do so would betray the Constitution."

Broader Implications for Democracy and Governance

The ruling carries profound implications for India’s democratic fabric:

• Artistic Freedom: The Court recognized poetry, satire, and art as vital to a vibrant democracy, shielding them from knee-jerk criminalization.
• Executive Accountability: It castigated law enforcement for insensitivity to constitutional rights, urging training programs to sensitize police on free speech.
• Role of Constitutional Courts: The judgment positioned the judiciary as the "first line of defense" against majoritarian excesses, echoing Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s vision of courts as custodians of liberty.

Conclusion

The Imran Pratapgadhi case is a clarion call for preserving India’s pluralistic ethos. By invalidating the FIR, the Supreme Court sent a clear message: in a democracy, the state cannot weaponize laws to silence dissent. The judgment’s emphasis on contextual interpretation, procedural safeguards, and judicial vigilance sets a benchmark for future free speech cases. As the Court poignantly noted, "75 years into our republic, we must trust our democracy to withstand words—even uncomfortable ones."

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult qualified legal professionals for specific legal concerns.